We present a new one way function based on the di culty of nding shortest vectors in lattices. This new function consists of exponentiation of an ideal in an order of a number eld and multiplication by an algebraic number which can both be performed in polynomial time. The best known algorithm for inverting this function is exponential in the degree of the lattices involved.
Introduction
In the past 20 years several number theoretic problems have been identi ed on whose di culty the security of cryptographic protocols can be based. Prominent examples are the factoring problem for integers RSA78] and the discrete logarithm problem in the multiplicative group of a nite eld Odl85] , in the class group of an order of a quadratic eld BW88], and on an elliptic curve curve over a nite eld Kob87] . There is, however, no guarantee that those problems remain di cult to solve in the future. On the contrary, as the experience with the factoring problem for integers shows unexpected breakthroughs are always possible. It is therefore important to design cryptographic schemes in such a way that the underlying mathematical problem can easily be replaced with another one. It is also important to search for mathematical problems on which secure one way functions can be based.
In this paper we show how to use ideal arithmetic in number elds to design a cryptographic one way function nf-exp with the following properties:
nf-exp can be computed in polynomial time. Inverting nf-exp is at least as hard as factoring integers.
The only method currently known for inverting nf-exp requires computing shortest vectors in lattices whose dimension is the degree of the number eld. This currently requires exponential time in the degree of the number eld.
This papers generalizes ideas which have been introduced in BW90] for orders of quadratic number elds. However, for quadratic elds, or more generally for number elds of xed degree nf-exp can be inverted in subexponential time (see Buc88] ). The new idea in this paper is to introduce the problem of computing shortest vectors in lattices of growing dimension as the basis for cryptographic security. This is done by considering number elds of growing degree. The problem of computing shortest vectors in lattices is known to be very di cult. It does not play a role in any of the schemes based on factoring, nite elds, quadratic number elds, and curves over nite elds. We therefore believe that the new one way function has some potential in future cryptographic applications.
The paper is organized as follows: In a rst section, we present the necessary concepts from algebraic number elds. Then, we explain nf-exp and show how to compute it e ciently. In Section 3, we sketch how to invert nf-exp and show its di culty. Finally, we present an example.
Algebraic number elds
In this section we brie y introduce the reader to algebraic number elds, orders, fractional ideals, and the arithmetic in those structures. For more details see BS96] .
By an algebraic number eld we mean an extension eld of the eld Q of rational numbers which, as a Q-vector space, is nite dimensional. The dimension is called the degree of the number eld. Let F be an algebraic number eld of degree n. Then there is a monic irreducible polynomial f 2 ZZ X] such that F is isomorphic to the residue class eld Q x]=(f) where (f) denotes the ideal generated by f in Q x]. We call f a generating polynomial of F. In the sequel we will assume that the number eld F is represented by a generating polynomial F and that F = Q x]=(f).
The elements of F are residue classes, i.e. they are of the form g + (f) with g 2 Q x]. Any such residue class has a unique representative of degree less than n. We assume that the residue classes are represented by those representatives. They can be obtained from any representative by division with remainder by f. Addition, subtraction, and multiplication of elements of F can be e ected by the addition, subtraction, and multiplication of the representing polynomials followed by a division with remainder by f. If g + (f) is a non zero element of f then its inverse can be computed as follows. Using the extended Euclidean algorithm a polynomial h is computed with gh 1 mod (f). Then h + (f) is the inverse of g + (f). Addition, subtraction, multiplication and inversion can obviously be performed in polynomial time.
Let 2 F. Then the map F ! F; 7 ! is an endomorphism of the Q-vector space F.
The trace of is the trace of this endomorphism. It is denoted by trace( ). The norm of is the the determinant of this endomorphism. It is denoted by norm( ).
Next we introduce orders and ideals thereof. An order O in F is a subring of F containing the element 1 which admits a ZZ-basis (! 1 ; : : : ; ! n ). We represent Or by such a ZZ-basis, where the basis elements are represented as described above. The discriminant of O is = det((trace(! i ! j ) 1 i;j n . The generating polynomial and the ZZ-basis of O can always be chosen in such a way that (log j j) O(1) bits are necessary to store them. We will assume that this is done. where i 2 F, 1 i n. As we have explained above, those elements are represented by polynomials of degree less than n. We will now assume that such a polynomial g(x) = g 1 x n?1 + : : : + g n?1 x + g n is represented by the coe cient vector (g 1 ; : : : ; g n ). Then the ideal I can be viewed as a lattice in Q n . If I and J are fractional O-ideals with bases ( 1 ; : : : ; n ) and ( 1 ; : : : ; n ), respectively, then ( i j ) 1 i;j n is a generating system of the product IJ as a lattice in Q n . Using Hermite normal form computation Coh93, 65 ], a basis thereof can be found in polynomial time.
We explain module reduction. For this purpose we need yet another interpretation of a fractional O-ideal as an n-dimensional lattice. Let 
), 1 i n are the conjugates of . There are positive integers r 1 , r 2 with r 1 + 2r 2 = n such that (i) 2 IR for 1 i r 1 , (i) 6 2 IR for r 1 < i n and Buc88] . The basic idea is as follows. A random exponent vector e 2 f1; : : : ; j jg jFBj is chosen. Then a reduced ideal K in the class Q P 2FB P e(P ) ] is computed. If K can be factored over FB, i.e. if K = Q P 2FB P f(P ) for some f 2 ZZ jFBj then v = e ? f is a relation on FB. To guarantee that the decomposition is successful with a su cient probability we use 1-reduction as in Buc88] . This means that we have to compute shortest vectors in n-dimensional lattices. Using the best known algorithm Kan87] for this problem this requires exponential time in n.
Once k is known we must nd . Note that JI ?k = O. Since we know k this means that we have to nd a generator of the principal ideal JI ?k . More generally let L be a principal ideal and suppose that we want to nd a generator of L. This generator can again be found by means of linear algebra. With each relation v on FB that we have computed we have also obtained a number = (v) 2 F such that Q P 2FB P v P = O. Now we choose again random vectors e 2 f1; : : : ; j jg jFBj . Then we compute 2 F and a reduced O-ideal K such that K = L Q P 2FB P e P . If K can be factored over FB, i.e.
if K = Q P 2FB P f P for some f 2 ZZ jFBj then L = Q P 2FB P e P ?fp . Then w = e ? f is a relation on FB. This computation took 51 ms.
A measure for the practical hardness of inverting nf-exp is given by the time used to compute the class group of O. The algorithm used can be modi ed to invert nf-exp, as explained in the last section. Assuming some mathematical reasonable conjecture, the class group of O is generated by two ideals and is isomorphic to ZZ=2ZZ ZZ=36ZZ. The computation took 16 seconds.
Conclusions
We have shown that the one way function nf-exp can in principle be used to implement cryptographic primitives such as key exchange and digital signatures. We have also argued that the only known method for inverting nf-exp requires computing shortest vectors in lattices whose dimension is the degree of the number eld in which nf-exp is implemented. This requires exponential time in the degree of the number eld.
There are two important open problems:
Can the algorithm for inverting nf-exp be improved? Can nf-exp be e ciently implemented?
As to the rst question it is conceivable that an algorithm for solving nf-dl can be designed which uses c-reduction with c > 1. Certainly, c = 2 n , for which the reduction algorithm is polynomial, is not su cient. But it may be possible to use some c which is subexponential in n. To implement such a c-reduction one can use the short vector algorithm described in Sch87]. This algorithm is a candidate for a subexponential time reduction procedure.
To answer the second question much more research has to be done. We suspect that for example very e cient implementations are possible for families of number elds which are given by very sparse generating polynomials.
